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The Flaws in Keynsian Borrow and Spend. 
Ralph S. Musgrave. 
 
Summary. 
Borrow and spend is a policy with several weaknesses. 1, it involves 
government borrowing something, that is money, which government can 
create in limitless quantities any time. 2, the “borrow” part of borrow and 
spend is deflationary: the opposite of the desired effect. 3, borrow and spend 
may result in interest rate increases and crowding out. To get round this, 
governments print extra money and buy back government securities. This is a 
charade: governments here are engaged in “print and spend” while pretending 
to effect “borrow and spend”. 4, when borrowings are paid back, the initial 
reflationary effect is reversed, thus borrow and spend does not have a 
permanent effect, whereas print and spend does. 5, one of the ways that 
borrow and spend works is that it supplies the private sector with additional 
assets (bonds which pay interest). This reduces “paradox of thrift” 
unemployment. But the private sector actually NEEDS or WANTS these 
assets, thus there is no need to pay interest to induce the recipients to accept 
those assets. Put another way, governments should issue zero interest bonds 
(i.e. cash) not interest paying bonds. 6, Borrow and spend expands the 
national debt, some of which will be held by foreigners. Paying interest to 
foreigners when no interest needs to be paid makes even less sense than 
paying such interest to natives. 
For the purposes of influencing unemployment and inflation, print and spend is 
a superior policy to adjusting interest rates because the latter is distortionary. 
___________ 
 
Note. This paper improves and extends the arguments against “borrow with a 
view to stimulus” in an earlier paper by the same author (Musgrave (2010). 
Copyright 2010 by Ralph S. Musgrave. Excerpts of up to a thousand words 
may be reproduced without permission as long as the source of such excerpts 






The word government refers here to government and 
central bank combined, unless otherwise stated. That is 
not to suggest that independent central banks are a bad 
idea.  
The phrase “print money” does not refer just to physical 
printing of bank notes, but to the more general concept: 
creation by banks of money out of thin air. 
Only countries that issue their own currencies are 
considered below. The points made below have obvious 
implications for common currency areas, like the 
Eurozone, but these are not considered.  





One of the main points made by Keynes was that in a 
recession, governments should borrow and spend. 
However, it has long been known that an alternative is 
for government to simply create extra money and spend 
it without borrowing. Indeed, Keynes (1933) himself 
made the point. To quote him: “Individuals must be 
induced to spend more…… through the expenditure of 
borrowed or printed money.” 
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Unfortunately, the merits of “print and spend” seem to 
have been half forgotten. As Hillinger (2010) put it, “An 
aspect of the crisis discussions that has irritated me the 
most is the implicit, or explicit claim that there is no 
alternative to governmental borrowing to finance the 
deficits incurred for stabilization purposes. It baffles me 
how such nonsense can be so universally accepted. Of 
course, there is a much better alternative: to finance the 
deficits with fresh money.” 
The purpose of this paper is first, to reiterate some of 
the arguments in favour of “print and spend”.  A second 
purpose is to argue that print and spend is not just an 
alternative to borrow and spend, but is actually a 
superior policy. A third objective is to take the argument 
still further, and argue that print and spend is superior to 
the main conventional method of regulating demand and 
inflation, namely altering interest rates. 
For the benefit of those under the illusion that inflation 
necessarily results from money supply increases, there 
is a section near the end of this paper dealing with this 
point. Also, in advocating print and spend, it is not 
suggested that governments will increase their 
countries’ money supply EVERY year. Given excess 
demand and inflation resulting for example from 
“irrational exuberance”, governments will from time to 
time need to do a “reverse print and spend”, that is run 




The flaws in borrow and spend. 
 
Six flaws in borrow and spend are now set out. 
1. When government borrows, it borrows something (i.e. 
money) which government can create in limitless 
quantities any time. To borrow something which one can 
create oneself in limitless quantities and at no cost is 
pointless. It is worse than a dairy farmer buying milk in a 
shop when there is a thousand litre tank of milk a few 
meters from the farmer’s house. At least the dairy farmer 
has the excuse that the milk in the tank cost 
SOMETHING to produce. 
In addition, where government borrows monetary base, 
as distinct from commercial bank created money, 
government borrows something which government itself 
created in the first place. 
Wright Patman, (chair of the House of Representatives 
Committee on Banking and Currency (1965–75)), made 
much the same point in the following way (Patman 
1941). 
“When our Federal Government, that has the exclusive 
power to create money, creates that money and then 
goes into the open market and borrows it and pays 
interest for the use of its own money, it occurs to me that 
that is going too far. I have never yet had anyone who 
could, through the use of logic and reason, justify the 
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Federal Government borrowing the use of its own 
money... I am saying to you in all sincerity, and with all 
the earnestness that I possess, it is absolutely wrong for 
the Government to issue interest-bearing obligations. It 
is not only wrong: it is extravagant. It is not only 
extravagant, it is wasteful. It is absolutely unnecessary.” 
2. A second strange aspect of borrow and spend stems 
from the fact that the whole object of the exercise is 
stimulus. But the borrow part of borrow and spend 
involves withdrawing money from the economy, the 
effect of which is deflationary: the opposite of the 
desired effect (as others, e.g. Dillard, 1948, p.110, have 
pointed out). In short, borrow and spend is a bit like 
throwing dirt over your car before cleaning it: the dirt 
probably does not a huge amount of harm. It is just 
pointless. 
3. Another questionable aspect of borrow and spend is 
that additional borrowing will at least on the face of it 
raise interest rates, which will tend to crowd out private 
sector borrowing and spending. There is of course some 
argument as to the extent of this crowding out, but 
certainly the risk is there. And that crowding out is 
exactly what is not needed in a recession. To counteract 
this undesirable effect, governments make sure that 
interest rates do NOT rise, by buying up government 
securities. Indeed, most governments in a recession go 
even further and actually reduce interest rates. 
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Now when government, 1, borrows, 2, issues securities 
and, 3, prints money with which to buy those securities, 
it is in effect engaged in print and spend rather than 
borrow and spend. This is a charade. That is, when 
governments claim to be engaged in borrow and spend, 
they are actually engaged, at least to some extent, in 
print and spend.  And in this scenario, it is legitimate to 
ask what really has the reflationary effect: borrow and 
spend or print and spend? 
Moreover, since the two polices both have a reflationary 
effect, one has to wonder what the point of borrow and 
spend is. That is, is borrow and spend much more than 
a paper chase? 
Incidentally, it is not suggested here that borrow and 
spend has the same effect dollar for dollar as print and 
spend.  The latter is doubtless a more potent weapon 
than the former, thus for a given stimulatory effect, a 
smaller dosage print and spend is needed than borrow 
and spend.  
4. Another nonsense behind borrow and spend is that if 
borrow and spend has a stimulatory effect, then 
presumably the opposite of borrow and spend, namely 
collecting extra tax and repaying the debt, has an equal 
and opposite effect. There is thus no PERMANENT 
effect. That permanent effect may or may not be 
needed. That is, the advocates of borrow and spend 
sometimes claim that borrow and spend just has a 
“pump priming” effect, and that is all that is needed.  
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However, if something more than a pump priming is 
needed, that is, if a PERMANENT effect is needed, 
borrow and spend will not produce it, without as a side 
effect, producing a permanently expanded national debt. 
In contrast, print and spend DOES have a permanent 
stimulatory effect: the private sector has a permanently 
increased stock of money, which induces that sector 
raise its spending on a permanent basis. 
5. There is a sense in which all demand deficient 
unemployment is paradox of thrift unemployment. This is 
not to say that the initial cause of every recession is an 
increased desire by the private sector to save. But 
certainly the desire to save played a big role in the 
1930s recession and in the current recession. That is in 
both cases, private sector balance sheets were 
damaged, which entirely predictably caused private 
sector entities to try to make good their balance sheets 
by saving more. 
Moreover, even if increased private sector saving has 
nothing to do with a recession, the way out of recessions 
is to have both public and private sectors spend more 
(assuming the aim is to have the proportion of GDP 
consumed by each sector to remain roughly constant). 
As to the public sector, it is not difficult to arrange this 
extra spending: just have government create more 
money and spend it. 
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The private sector is different, in that private sector 
entities cannot be ordered to spend a specific sum of 
money in a given period of time. Thus governments 
resort to numerous ways to inducing the private sector 
to spend: “cash for clunkers” or government backing for 
mortgages are just two examples. 
But a weakness in any measure targeted on specific 
products (as in the above two examples - cars and 
houses) is that they are market distorting. However, 
market distorting measures are unjustified unless it can 
be shown that the market itself is distorted in some way, 
which would justify a countervailing distortionary 
measure (or perhaps “anti-distortionary measure” would 
be a better phrase). And it is unusual for governments to 
consider (never mind demonstrate) what market 
distortions might need rectifying before introducing their 
own weird selection of distortionary measures. That is, 
much the most common reason for implementing market 
distorting measures is that they have populist appeal: 
they win votes. 
For example “Cash for clunkers” is a simple idea which 
every voter understands. And government backing for 
mortgages is bound to win votes. If the latter results in 
ridiculous “no income no job” mortgages and credit 
crunches many years later which do catastrophic 
economic damage, that will not worry the politicians who 
introduce the measure.  
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At any rate, should some unusually wise government 
want to induce the private sector to spend more in a 
non-distorting way, about the only way of doing so is 
simply to boost private sector incomes and/or feed extra 
assets to private sector pockets. This ought to raise 
private sector spending for two reasons. First, a rise in 
household incomes induces households to spend more. 
Second, household assets expand, which has the same 
effect. 
Now for the question as to what form these extra assets 
should take. In the case of borrow and spend, the 
private sector is supplied with extra assets in the form of 
government bonds, which pay interest. In contrast, in the 
case of print and spend, the private sector is supplied 
with additional assets which pay no interest, that is cash. 
Which of these two is the better? 
Well, there is no need to pay interest on those assets 
because the private sector actually WANTS or NEEDS 
those assets if it is to be induced to spend at a rate that 
brings full employment!  
Conclusion: borrow and spend involves government in 
paying interest, when there is no need to. To that extent, 
print and spend is a better policy. 
Having concluded that borrow and spend involves 
paying unnecessary interest, this is NOT to suggest that 




The above point regarding unnecessary interest is 
applicable to where government borrows for stimulus 
purposes. It is NOT applicable to where government 
borrows as a substitute for taxation. 
To illustrate, if an economy is at full employment, the 
private sector will almost by definition have the stock of 
assets which induces it to spend at the “full employment” 
rate. And in this scenario, if the private sector is to be 
induced to abstain from consumption so as to make 
room for extra public sector spending, the private sector 
has to be induced or forced to engage in the latter 
abstinence. 
Tax is the “force” option, and paying interest on 
borrowed money is the “induce” option. And there is no 
avoiding the need for a financial inducement in the latter 
case: that is, there is no way of escaping the need to 
pay interest. 
But to repeat, where stimulus is the objective, there is no 
need whatever to pay interest! To that extent, borrow 
and spend with a view to stimulus is a flawed policy. 
6. The final undesirable aspect of borrow and spend is 
that it expands the national debt, and the larger the 
national debt, the more of such debt is likely to end up in 
the hands for foreign entities. Borrowing from abroad 
CAN make sense. But paying interest to foreign lenders 
when (as pointed out above) no interest needs to be 
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paid, is even more pointless than paying such interest to 
natives. 
 
Should interest rates be used to regulate 
economies? 
 
A possible objection to the above anti borrowing 
arguments is that it implies an abolition or near abolition 
of government borrowing, which in turn might appear to 
make it difficult for governments to adjust interest rates, 
because governments effect these adjustments by 
buying or selling government stock. 
To be more accurate, the fact of not engaging in borrow 
and spend for stimulus purposes does not rule out 
borrowing as an alternative to tax. But the arguments for 
the latter are about as feeble as the arguments for 
borrowing for stimulus purposes (see Musgrave (2010) 
and Kellerman (2006). Thus there is a good argument 
for abolishing or reducing ALL forms of government 
borrowing. 
So would a reduced supply of government stock make 
interest rate adjustments more difficult, and if so, would 
this matter? There are various reasons, as follows, for 
think that the answer is a “double negative”. 
First, using interest rates to adjust demand is 
distortionary, since it works only via entities that are 
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significantly reliant on variable rate loans. It is true that 
changes in the level of activity by these entities 
ultimately affects or “trickles down to” other entities. For 
example, given an interest rate cut, additional activity by 
the former entities will ultimately trickle down to other 
entities. But that is not ideal. 
In particular, by the time the trickle down is half 
complete, it is possible the economy is suffering excess 
demand and inflation, and stimulus from any further 
“trickle down” is exactly what is NOT needed. 
Incidentally, having criticised interest rate adjustments 
for their undesirable delayed effects, it should be 
admitted that print and spend has undesirable delayed 
effects which could be equally bad. That is, a proportion 
of any additional cash fed to the private sector will be 
saved, and may be spent exactly when additional 
spending is not desirable: in an inflationary boom. 
In contrast to the DELAYED effects of different policies, 
and getting back to the INITIAL effects, it is relevant to 
ask whether print and spend would be less distortionary 
than interest rate changes. The answer is that with a 
little ingenuity, the INITIAL effects of print and spend can 
be almost distortion free.  
For example, a payroll tax cut would benefit EVERY 
employer and employee in the country. That is quite a 
big chunk of the economy! Admittedly a payroll tax 
change leaves out pensioners, those on social security, 
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and perhaps some other groups.  But with a little 
ingenuity these groups could be catered for. 
A second reason for thinking a reduced supply of 
government stock would not matter stems from the fact 
that there must be some optimum amount of investment 
in any economy per dollar of GDP. And for a given state 
of technological development and so on, a plausible 
assumption is that this “investment per dollar of GDP” 
will not change given a small change in GDP. 
Now the purpose of an interest rate reduction, for 
example, is to expand the economy a small amount. But 
the rate reduction will also increase the amount of 
investment per dollar of GDP: totally illogical! 
In fact, interest rate changes are arguably even MORE 
illogical that the above two paragraphs suggest. Reason 
is that given excess unemployment, if there is to be any 
change in the amount of investment per head (or per 
dollar of GDP), there should arguably be a REDUCTION 
in the amount of investment per head. Put another way, 
given excess unemployment, there is arguably merit in 
encouraging employers, at least temporarily, to employ 
MORE people for given investment, not LESS! 
Third, there is an obvious and serious distortion resulting 
from low interest rates: asset price bubbles. And in the 
case of housing, there is the already mentioned 
catastrophic economic damage that can be done when 
these bubbles burst. 
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A fourth reason for thinking a reduced number of or 
volume of government bonds would not matter is that 
the fact of not borrowing for stimulus or “substitute for 
tax” purposes does not rule out borrowing specifically so 
as to influence interest rates. (As pointed out by Abba 
Lerner). Indeed, where a government wanted for 
example to damp down demand by raising interest 
rates, the effect would come not just from the increased 
rates. Such a government would announce a willingness 
to borrow at a higher rate than the prevailing rate. That 
in turn would withdraw funds from the economy, which 
(as pointed out under the second objection to borrow 
and spend above) is deflationary. At least that would be 
the effect, assuming the money borrowed is not spent.  
Fifth and finally, “zero government borrowing” monetary 
system was set out by Friedman (1948), which suggests 
that an absence of, or much reduced supply of 
government securities would not be a problem.   
The conclusion is that a reduced supply of government 
securities resulting from a print and spend policy would 
not make it significantly more difficult for governments to 
raise interest rates. And even if it did make it more 
difficult, that would not matter in that print and spend is a 






A counter argument. 
It could be argued that the costs of borrow and spend 
are not all that great, in that while this policy IS a 
pointless paper chase, the costs of paper pushing as a 
proportion of GDP are small. (Not a strong argument in 
view of the astronomic costs of the average country’s 
bureaucracy, but never mind!) 
However, against that, there is a real and more serious 
problem as follows. An ever expanding national debt, or 
a national debt that expands relatively fast, causes a 
significant number of influential people to campaign for 
cuts in government spending (or tax increases). The two 
latter DO HAVE serious economic consequences: the 
result is a decline in demand in real terms, and means 
unnecessary unemployment. And this is a very real 
problem in the U.S. at the time of writing. 
Another possible counter argument is that the 
requirement for government to borrow from its central 
bank prevents politicians having direct access to the 
money printing press. (Government and central bank are 
treated as separate entities here, as distinct from the 
usage adopted elsewhere in this paper, namely treating 
the two as the same entity). 
The effects of government borrowing from its central 
bank are very different from where the two treated as 
one unit borrow from the rest of the economy. At any 
rate, is there even much to be said for government 
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borrowing from its own central bank with a view to 
keeping a distinction between the two? 
The answer is “no” because it would be quite easy to 
frame a set of rules suitable for a “zero borrowing” 
economy where was nevertheless a clear distinction 
between government and central bank. For example the 
rule could be that government must work on the 
assumption that its spending shall equal what it collects 
in tax. While the central bank is responsible for inflation 
(as most central banks currently are), and controls 
inflation by allowing government additional funds where, 
for example, unemployment is excessive and inflation is 
subdued.  
 
Printing money does not necessarily cause inflation. 
Having argued the case for print and spend, objections 
may be raised to the effect that printing money 
necessarily means inflation. Readers who have a grasp 
of when money printing does and does not cause 
inflation can stop reading this paper now. 
Printing money does NOT cause inflation to the 
following extent. 
1. As economies expand, all other things being equal, 
they require an expanded money supply. To illustrate, 
the money supply of the U.S. is (amazingly) much bigger 
than that of Liechenstein or Andorra. 
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2. An expanded money supply is NOT inflationary until it 
is actually spent (as pointed out by Hume (1752) and by 
Keynes (1933) and numerous others.) For example if I 
print a million tons of £50 notes and hide them down a 
disused coal mine and don’t tell anyone what I’ve done, 
the effect on inflation would be zero. 
And the latter is an illustration which is very relevant to 
the basic argument in this paper. That is, it was argued 
above that where the private sector is trying to save 
extra cash, government needs to print extra cash so as 
to supply the savings that the private sector requires. 
That extra cash will not have a big effect until the private 
sector finds it has TOO MUCH cash. Whereupon there 
WILL be an effect on demand, and possibly an effect on 
inflation. 
It is of course possible that the private sector will react to 
an increased money supply by ASSUMING that any 
money supply increase will cause inflation, and factoring 
in this inflation into wage agreements, prices of products 
and so on. However this is totally unrealistic. That is the 
idea that the average household keeps an eye on the 
monetary aggregates is fanciful. 
The above is typical of the sort of totally unrealistic idea 
proposed by academic economists with a view to 




Plus the evidence does not support the latter idea. For 
example the U.S. monetary base expanded by an 
astronomic and unprecedented amount in 2009. The 
economically unsophisticated were screaming 
“Mugabwe” and “Weimar” as a result. The actual effect 
of that base increase eighteen months later (at the time 
of writing) is approximately zero. And as regards the 
future, yields on U.S. long term government stock, at the 
time of writing, are at record lows, thus the markets are 
not factoring in rampant inflation any time soon. 
3. A significant amount of money printing is made 
necessary simply as a result of the widely agreed idea 
that inflation of around 2% is optimum (as opposed to 
4%, minus 2%, or any other figure). Reasons are thus. 
First, inflation of 2% reduces the real value of the money 
supply by 2% a year. That depreciation requires money 
printing simply to keep the value of the money supply 
constant in real terms (never mind, as pointed out 
above, the money printing required to keep the real 
value of the money supply expanding at the same rate 
as the economy). 
Second, assuming a country has a national debt, and 
that that debt is to remain more or less constant in the 
long term as a proportion of GDP, further money printing 
is required to keep that proportion constant. Put another 
way, that “real term” proportion will not remain constant 
if the national debt is not expanded in nominal or “dollar” 
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terms. And that in turn requires and expanded stock of 
dollars (in the case of the U.S.). 
All in all, a fair amount of money printing is required 
simply to “keep things constant”.   
The net result is that most years there will be a net 
expansion in the money supply. It is only during the 
occasional burst of excess demand (perhaps resulting 
from “irrational exuberance”) that government will run a 
surplus, i.e. need to rein in money and actually 
REDUCE the money supply.  
4. Governments up to about ten years ago tried to 
control inflation by controlling the money supply. It didn’t 
work because (with the exception of lunatic Mugabwe 
type money supply increases) there is little relationship 
between money supply changes and inflation. At least 
the relationship is too feeble to make the above inflation 
control tool a useful one. 
5. In the particular case of quantitative easing (of 
government stock), this is often classified as “money 
printing”. And certainly the monetary base rises by $X 
for every $X of government stock QEd. But QE consists 
essentially of giving holders of one form of government 
liability (bonds) another form of government liability 
(cash). To put it in another and figurative way, one type 
of valuable bit of paper is swapped for another type of 
valuable bit of paper. Apart from boosting asset prices, 
and possibly causing asset price bubbles, there is little 
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reason to suppose this will have much effect on 
anything: demand, inflation or anything else. 
Conclusion: the idea that a money supply increase 
automatically causes inflation is grossly over simple. To 
gauge the inflationary effects, it is necessary to look at 
several factors. Three of those factors are as follows 
(but there are doubtless several more). 1, the state of 
the economy. That is, is the economy in a state of 
excess unemployment and subdued inflation or is it 
suffering labour shortages and excess demand? 2, Who 
are the recipients of the additional money: people likely 
to spend it, or people likely to save it. 3, Does the money 
supply increase result (as in the case of QE) simply from 
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